Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming

From: The Snowy Torrents

The U.S. Forest Service rated the back-country avalanche danger low. Though natural avalanches were not expected the National Park Service added to their daily reports on February 2-3 that "widespread pockets of unstable shallow soft slab could be found at higher elevations."

ACCICENT SUMMARY
Late in the afternoon of February 2, Bruce Melliger, 29, called Grand Teton National Park to register a friend and him to climb a couloir on the northeast side of Mt. Wister (11,490 feet). Ranger Lynn Woodward took down the required information and told Melliger to either fill out the late registration box or telephone upon his return. During their conversation Ranger Woodward asked Melliger if he was going to take his avalanche rescue beacon. He said he would have it. After Melliger hung up, Woodward filled out the permit and placed it on the board in the Permits Office.

Early the next morning, February 3, Melliger showed up at the Permits Office just as the rangers arrived. He had had a change in his plans; he would be climbing solo - his friend had cancelled. Melliger talked with Ranger Dan Burgette.

As they talked Ranger Burgette learned Melliger was not familiar with Mt. Wister. Burgette added that though he had not climbed the mountain he was very concerned about Melliger's proposed route. To climb the Northeast Couloir above Lake Taminah, Melliger would have to ascend a large, steep north-facing snow slope. Burgette was leary of a solo climber tackling such a route even though the U.S. Forest Service had been rating the backcountry danger at low for about two weeks. They talked about the avalanche conditions and Melliger agreed not to climb the route, but he sill wanted to do a one-day solo climb of Mt. Wister. He knew that a local climber had soloed the mountain in January.

Burgette informed him the climber ascended the Southeast Couloir. The two men reviewed the guidebook and both agreed that the Southeast Couloir was the logical route to solo. The couloir is a narrow gully - in places only 10 feet wide - with several rock bands. Burgette knew that Melliger was an experienced mountaineer and sometimes climbed solo. The Southeast Couloir was well within Melliger's capabilities. At 0930, Melliger left the Visitor Center in his yellow Honda Civic and headed to the trailhead at Taggart Lake.

Melliger skied to the base of a couloir on the southeast side of Mt. Wister, where he cached his skis, poles, and shovel. He began climbing the narrow couloir, kicking steps in the snow as he passed the lower rock bands. Melliger was probably approaching the upper part of the couloir when he triggered a shallow soft-slab avalanche. It was only about 6 inches deep, but this was enough snow to knock Melliger's feet out from under him. Without protection he was swept on a fast and fatal plunge down the couloir.

RESCUE
The next morning, February 4, Ranger Burgette, learned that the Melliger had not signed out from his climb. Burgette called the emergency number that Melliger had indicated on the permit. Melliger had not come home. Burgette then drove out to the Taggart Lake trailhead where he found Melliger's yellow Honda covered by snow. Melliger was overdue, not a serious situation but a situation that required more investigation. From different positions along the Park roads spotting scopes were used but no sign of Melliger was observed.

At about 1000 hours a helicopter was placed on standby. Plans were made to initiate a search of Melliger failed to show-up by late morning. By 1120 there had been no sighting of Melliger, and the search mission was started. Seasonal rangers Renny Jackson and Jim Woodmencey were recruited, and the helicopter was requested to respond to the Park. Additional rescuers including avalanche dogs from the Jackson Hole Ski Area were notified and placed on standby. Shortly after 1300 hours Rangers Burgette and Jackson were flown up Avalanche Canyon to do an aerial reconnaissance of the canyon and Mt. Wister. From the air the rangers spotted a recent avalanche in the southeast-facing gully on the east shoulder of Mt. Wister. Also the men could see tracks leading into the avalanche. At 1350 hours the two rangers were dropped off below the avalanche and the helicopter returned to pickup Rangers Woodmencey and Berkenfield.

At 1615 the second team of rangers was dropped off the men followed Melliger's tracks up toward the gully and the avalanche. The tracks were mostly filled by wind-blown snow. About 20 minutes later the rangers found Melliger's skis, poles and shovel cached near the base of the couloir. It was all too obvious what had happened; the helicopter was sent to Jackson Hole to pickup the avalanche search dogs and their handlers. The rangers moved out onto the debris and started their hasty search. At 1447 hours they found Melliger's body mostly buried in the shallow debris.

Melliger's body was found at 9,200 feet. He had suffered obvious major injuries and probably died during the avalanche. There was no sign that he tried to move after he stopped. It is uncertain how far Melliger had climbed up the couloir. Rangers could discern his foot tracks going through the lowest rock band. It can only be assumed that Melliger had climbed up the center of the gully, and his tracks were swept away.

AVALANCHE DATA
From the air, a 6-inch fracture could be seen just below the ridgecrest at the top of the southeast-facing gully. The shallow fracture line extended 100 feet across the starting zone but eh avalanche funneled into the narrow gully and spilled over several rock bands before spreading out in the fan-shaped runout zone. It ran from an elevation of 10,500 to 8,800 feet. The avalanche could have been triggered by the victim, or the avalanche could have released naturally. Rangers did see a natural avalanche on the other side of the mountain.

COMMENTS
This accident illustrates two important points. First, that super-cold temperatures can quickly weaken the snow cover. Over a period of only days the low density surface snow lost strength as faceted grains developed from kinetic or temperature-gradient metamorphism. The new faceted grains became the weak layer for the little snow that fell during the first couple of days in February. The second important point is that even very shallow - 6-inch deep - avalanches can turn into killers for the unroped or solo climber. It takes relatively little moving snow to knock a climber off his feet and tumble him down a gully. While no one knows how high Melliger had climbed before the avalanche swept him to his death, one thing certain was that he was climbing the wrong gully. The gully he had signed out to climb was further west and below the summit of Mt. Wister. Though he was killed in the wrong gully, he might have met a similar fate even if he had climbed the correct gully. Both were high elevation gullies that faced southeast, so the snow and avalanche conditions would have been similar. The message is still the same. When climbing solo there is no margin for error.