FATALITY ARTICLES

Jackson Hole, Wyoming

From: The Snowy Torrents
WEATHER CONDITIONS
For 5 days strong winds and heavy snow ravaged the Jackson Hole Ski Area, as the same wet Pacific storms that hit Utah …swept into Wyoming. On the morning of the 17th west - southwest winds averaged 35 mph, and gusts over 100 mph raked the top of Rendezvous Peak. In the past 24 hours 12 inches of new now, with 1.5 inches of water equivalent had fallen. Since the storm had started on the 13th, 64 inches of snow with 7.62 inches of [water equivalent] had accumulated. During the storm, gunners had shot the Moran Face and adjacent steep areas daily with the recoilless rifle, while patrollers tossed hand charges daily beginning on the 15th. Also, on the 15th a small natural avalanche released on Moran Face: however, on the 16th two large bombs were detonated without results. On the morning of the 17th the artillery control team fired one round from the 105-millimeter recoilless rifle into Moran Face. The round hit a tree and detonated, but did not release an avalanche. Control work elsewhere on the lower portion of the mountain failed to trigger avalanches except for one highly - active avalanche path.

ACCIDENT SUMMARY
Shortly after 0800, ski patrolmen Tom Raymer, John Bernadyn, and Paul Rice received the go ahead from the artillery crew to begin hand charge control work on Moran Face. It was snowing about 1 inch per hour when the patrollers left the top of the Casper Chair Lift and started across the Moran Traverse. The three carried Skadis (avalanche rescue transceivers), shovels, and six explosives (11 pounds). Though the ski area was closed and only ski patrol hazard reduction teams were allowed on the mountain, they made sure the flip - sign read "closed."

They tossed their first explosive charge, a 1-pounder, onto a small steep pitch about 50 yards from the main portion of Moran Face. The charge detonated but no avalanche released. They then traversed toward Moran Face and stopped beside the last two trees to evaluate the situation. Up above they could see where the artillery round had blown up the tree. Though the round hit the tree they felt the concussion of the blast had shocked the slope hard.

Right before the entrance to the Face are two small slopes, one above and one below the traverse. Raymer threw a charge onto the upper pitch at the same time Rice threw a charge onto the lower pitch. Both 2-pound charges exploded, but again, nothing happened. No avalanches.

Rice then skied out onto the Face toward an old shot hole and some old debris. The slope had released naturally 2 days before. Rice continued past the hole to a tall rack outcrop. He noticed the snow was less deep - 2 feet instead of the 4 feet they had encountered earlier. Bernadyn crossed below to another rock. While Raymer waited, Bernadyn threw a hand charge downslope. Another explosion but no avalanche. Raymer traversed across. Then Rice threw a fifth hand charge: again, no results.

After six explosive charges (one artillery shot and five hand charges) and no avalanches, the three took time to discuss what to do next. Rice and Bernadyn wer perched on rocks, but Raymer was out on the slope.

About 40 seconds had passed before they decided to leave the slope. It was then that Rice saw a large avalanche release on the slope above Raymer. He yelled a warning, and Raymer, standing still, looked uphill and saw the slide. He swung his skis downhill and started to ski down but the avalanche hit him immediately. He disappeared.

The slide missed Bernadyn and Rice who were standing on rocks out of the avalanche path. They tried to watch Raymer but could only see the whiteness of the avalanche. From the force of the moving snow, they knew Raymer would be carried well down the slope.

RESCUE
Rice immediately reported the accident on his radio. Rice skied to Bernadyn, who was just pulling his beacon out. Rice said he would try to search very quickly and asked Bernadyn to follow more slowly and thoroughly. After three wide traverses from the last seen area Rice found a ski. He stopped and stuck the ski upright into the snow. After determining Raymer's Probable trajectory in the slide, Rice started skiing down again. Raymer's ski was almost 200 feet below the last seen area. Rice continued down but still had no signal. He later reflected that the debris seemed to go on forever. The debris entered into the trees and finally Rice picked up a signal from Raymer's Skadi™. Three or four minutes had passed. Rice radioed to Bernadyn to come down.

Bernadyn and Rice narrowed their search immediately around a big pin (3-4 feet in diameter), but they could not turn the volume down to the lowest setting without losing the signal. They knew Raymer was buried deeply. Patrollers started arriving, but probing and digging failed to locate Raymer. Another patroller verified the area using his beacon. They knew Raymer had to be under or just uphill of the tree.

Branches above the snow got in the way of rescuers. They could not get an exact position with their beacons. Buried branches had to be cut away so shovelers could dig. Rescuers kept digging and probing. Every 5 minutes or so they would re-do the beacon search and put a trained rescue dog in to hole. All indications were they were in the right area, but they still had not found Raymer. After 30 minutes addition rescuers arrived: ski school instructors, ski guides, hosts, and a few locals who had volunteered. They kept digging, probing and searching, but no luck. Finally, they reached the ground. Using his beacon on its lowest volume setting vertically along the pit wall, Rice heard Raymer's signal. They had missed him, Rice knew he was close. He called for the area to be probed. Nothing. They decided to enlarge the hole and quickly they found Raymer. He was not breathing, and both legs were broken; he had been buried for 45 minutes at a depth of 10 - 12 feet.

Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was started immediately. He was transported down the mountain to the medical clinic in the base area where he was pronounced dead.

AVALANCHE DATA
This slide was classified as an SS-AO-5-O and was a post-control release. It fractured 3 feet deep about 100 feet above where Raymer was standing. He was carried 600 feet down through stands of mature timber on the east-facing slope. The 37º slope released from about 8,400 feet in elevation. It was the largest avalanche observed on Moran Face area since the ski area opened in 1965.

COMMENTS
This was a deadly example of a post-control release that ran minutes after the last hand charge had detonated. The avalanche release the snow where the first three hand charges had been thrown. Though we don't understand the process of post-control releases, we suspect that the following scenario is plausible suspect that the following scenario is plausible: The explosives jolted and weakened the snow in the immediate vicinity of the bomb crater but strong snow between the blast areas held the slab in place, at least for a few minutes. As stress was redistributed in the slab over the next few minutes, the strong areas could no longer hold the slab in place and shear failure occurred over the entire slab. Raymer himself may have been the ultimate trigger when he skied onto the slab. Since the accident the ski patrol has added two additional artillery targets in the avalanche path

The accident demonstrates that even a textbbook rescue done by professionals cannot save all avalanche victims. The overhanging branches mixed in the debris greatly hampered the rescue, though a faster rescue probably would not have saved Raymer's life anyway: No one in the United States has yet to survive a burial deeper than 6 feet. The deep burial resulting from the trauma Raymer sustained during the fall; it made self-help impossible